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Oliphant and Its Discontents: An Essay Introducing the Case
for Reargument before the American Indian Nations
Supreme Court
Judith V. Royster'
If anything ever proved the old adage that people fear that which they do not
understand, it is the Supreme Court's approach to tribal authority over non-Indians.
And if any decision illustrates that approach, it is the case reargued to the American
Indian Nations Supreme Court at the University of Kansas Tribal Law and Governance
Conference, the infamous Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe,2 that began it all.
The facts of Oliphant are straightforward. Mark David Oliphant and his co-
defendant were on the Port Madison Reservation during the Suquamish Tribe's annual
celebration. Tribal police arrested both men in separate incidents. Oliphant was
charged with assaulting a tribal officer and resisting arrest. The other man was charged
with reckless endangerment and injury to tribal property after he led tribal police on a
high-speed chase that ended when he crashed into a tribal police car. Both men sought
a writ of habeas corpus in federal district court. The district court denied the petitions,
the Ninth Circuit affirmed in Oliphant's case, and the Supreme Court took the cases on
review.
3
I imagine the justices moving from bewilderment to indignation. There is a Far
Side cartoon that illustrates what they must have felt. A few settlers with guns are
hunkered down by their covered wagons; the wagons are pierced with flaming arrows
setting the wagon covers afire. One man looks at another and says: "Hey, they're
lighting their arrows. Can they DO that? ' 4 I imagine Justice Rehnquist 5 with that
same look of outraged incredulity on his face. "Hey, they're prosecuting some white
kid. Can they DO that?" Unfortunately for Indian tribes, Justice Rehnquist was in a
position to answer that question. His answer, of course, was "No."
I. AN INTRODUCTION TO OLIPHANT
The basic holding of Oliphant is as straightforward as its facts: Indian tribes
have no criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians. In all likelihood, the case was decided
on the basis of the demographics. The Court began its decision with a recitation of
facts not technically relevant to its ultimate outcome. It noted that the Port Madison
Reservation had been subject to allotment; that almost two-thirds of the reservation
land was owned by non-Indians; that the state of Washington provided schools, roads,
and public utilities to the reservation; and that non-Indians on the reservation
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outnumbered tribal citizens by a ratio of nearly sixty to one. Nothing in those facts
was germane to the categorical assertion that tribes may not exercise any criminal
jurisdiction over non-Indians. The facts were, however, pertinent to the Court's
outrage over the Suquamish Tribe's exercise of criminal jurisdiction over Oliphant and
his co-defendant.
Over a one-paragraph dissent,6 the Court offered a fairly elaborate three-
pronged rationale for its decision. The first prong was the notion that all three
branches of the federal government shared a common historical understanding that
tribes could not exercise criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians. This was arguably the
most indecent piece of "reasoning" that the Court has ever produced.7 It is a textbook
model of how to obscure unfavorable law, relegate contrary facts and precedent to
footnotes, and argue using only highly selective snippets that support the preferred
position. 8 As a lawyer's brief, this is probably ethical. As a decision by the nation's
highest court, it is an embarrassment. Oliphant is in that sense a transformative
opinion. Anyone who reads it can never look at the Court in quite the same way again.
The second prong of the Court's approach rested on the Suquamish Tribe's
treaty. In the Treaty of Point Elliott, the tribe acknowledged its dependence on the
United States, a standard treaty provision of the time that the Court interpreted "in all
probability" as recognizing exclusive United States criminal jurisdiction over non-
Indians. 9 Abandoning the Indian law canons of construction that call for treaties to be
construed in favor of the tribes,' 0 the Court instead found that the Suquamish treaty
should be read against a backdrop of the common federal understanding that Indian
tribes had no criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians.
The third prong, however, was the heart of the Court's decision. The common
historical understanding was "not conclusive" by itself," and the treaty, standing
alone, was "probably not... sufficient" either.' But waiting in the wings was the
notion of "intrinsic limitations" on tribal governmental powers. 13 Indian tribes are,
within federal law, "quasi-sovereign" governments dependent upon the United States.I4
They may exercise only those governmental powers not "inconsistent with" that
dependent status.15 Consequently, the Court held that Indian tribes "necessarily" lost
the authority to prosecute non-Indians for offenses committed within tribal territories.
II. THE IMPACTS OF OLIPHANT
The impacts of Oliphant over the twenty-five years since the decision was
handed down have been wide-ranging and severe. The decision has impacted law
enforcement in Indian country, undermined the territorial integrity of tribal
governments, and launched the Supreme Court's on-going efforts to sweep away much
of tribal civil jurisdiction over non-tribal citizens.
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A. Law Enforcement Impacts
The law enforcement impacts of Oliphant have seriously compromised safety
within Indian country. If Indian tribes do not have authority to prosecute non-Indians
for crimes committed within Indian country, that task falls either to the state or the
federal government. Neither is capable of performing it well.
As a general rule, the creation of Indian country preempts state authority, at
least as to matters involving Indians. Congress may authorize state jurisdiction over
such matters, but unless it has done so, federal and tribal authority are exclusive. With
respect to criminal jurisdiction, the Indian Country Crimes Act authorizes federal
prosecution of non-Indians who commit crimes against Indians.' 7 Under a judicially-
crafted exception, states exercise criminal jurisdiction over crimes between non-
Indians on the theory that those crimes do not impact tribal interests.1 8 States operating
under a grant of jurisdiction under Public Law 28019 (PL-280) or similar legislation20
have the same criminal authority within Indian country as they do without it, and thus
may prosecute all crimes committed by non-Indians. Relatively few states, however,
have taken criminal jurisdiction under PL-280, so criminal authority over non-Indians
post-Oliphant is usually split between the federal and state governments.
Neither government holds the resources, and neither has generally
demonstrated the will to prosecute minor crimes non-Indians commit on reservations.
Although serious crimes may be addressed promptly, relatively minor or nuisance
crimes, such as drag racing, open containers of alcohol, and prostitution, are often
below the radar of a remote U.S. attorney or county prosecutor who is saddled with
limited resources. Tribal governments, which are in the best position to detect, deter,
and prosecute these crimes, are unable to do so under the holding of Oliphant.
The law enforcement problem will likely grow worse. In the aftermath of the
events of September 11, 2001, Attorney General John Ashcroft announced a
reorientation of the Federal Bureau of Investigation's responsibilities from more
traditional law enforcement activities toward increasing anti-terrorism functions. 21 The
FBI, however, is the primary investigative agency for crimes in Indian country
committed by non-Indians against Indians. If its mission shifts away from basic law
enforcement, the impacts on already-strapped resources in Indian country could be
severe.
An additional law enforcement impact arises from the nature of the crime
allegedly committed by Mark David Oliphant. He assaulted a tribal cop. Virtuall!y
every jurisdiction considers assault on a law enforcement officer a special crime.22
Those assaults are not just personal assaults, but assaults against the government itself.
Oliphant deprives tribes of the opportunity afforded to every other government: to treat
an assault on its own officers as a heightened form of crime. Tribal governments
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cannot prosecute non-Indians for a crime against the authority of the government itself.
Instead, they are dependent upon the federal government or a state government
utilizing PL-280, to prosecute these crimes as ordinary assaults, if they are prosecuted
at all.
B. The Loss of Territorial Sovereignty
Although Oliphant is arguably the most serious judicial onslaught on tribal
territorial sovereignty, it was not the first attack on this jurisdiction. The first
onslaught is traceable to the 1881 decision in United States v. McBratney.23 Under
what has come to be known as the McBratney rule, the Court created an exception to
exclusive federal/tribal jurisdiction within Indian country. The Court ruled that crimes
committed in Indian country solely between non-Indians were within the jurisdiction of
the states, on a theory that activities not involving Indians do not impact the concerns
or interests of the Indian tribes. The absurdity of that theory should be obvious: no
other government is required to ignore crimes committed within its boundaries
between non-citizens. Nonetheless, with that one important exception, the Court left
the territorial integrity of the tribes intact.
Oliphant, the second judicial onslaught, changed that. This was no crime
between non-citizens; this was a crime against an officer of the tribal government
itself. Whatever the legitimacy of McBratney, its rationale cannot possibly be
extended to crimes against the tribe and its citizens. Oliphant thus marks the first time
the Court ruled that activities within a tribe's territory that unquestionably impacted the
tribe were not within the tribe's authority to address.
Although Oliphant is arguably the most serious judicial onslaught on tribal
territorial sovereignty, it was not the first attack on this jurisdiction. The first
onslaught is traceable to the 1881 decision in United States v. McBratney.24 Under
what has come to be known as the McBratney rule, the Court created an exception to
exclusive federal/tribal jurisdiction within Indian country. The Court ruled that crimes
committed in Indian country solely between non-Indians were within the jurisdiction of
the states, on a theory that activities not involving Indians do not impact the concerns
or interests of the Indian tribes. The absurdity of that theory should be obvious: no
other government is required to ignore crimes committed within its boundaries
between non-citizens. Nonetheless, with that one important exception, the Court left
the territorial integrity of the tribes intact.
Oliphant, the second judicial onslaught, changed that. This was no crime
between non-citizens; this was a crime against an officer of the tribal government
itself. Whatever the legitimacy of McBratney, its rationale cannot possibly be
extended to crimes against the tribe and its citizens. Oliphant thus marks the first time
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the Court ruled that activities within a tribe's territory that unquestionably impacted the
tribe were not within the tribe's authority to address.
III. OPENING THE DOOR FOR THE LOSS OF CIVIL AUTHORITY
For a short time, it appeared that Oliphant and its inroads on territorial
sovereignty were confined to criminal jurisdiction. The Court made much of potential
64 25
"unwarranted intrusions on [non-Indians'] personal liberty," a criminal law concern.
Additionally, Williams v. Lee offset Oliphant on the civil side.26 In Williams, the Court
held that a civil lawsuit by a non-Indian plaintiff against an Indian defendant for a
cause of action arising in Indian country was within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
tribal court. The Court determined that state jurisdiction would interfere with "the
right of reservation Indians to make their own laws and be ruled by them."
27
28Then came Montana v. United States. Only three years after Oliphant, the
Court extended to tribal legislative and regulatory jurisdiction Oliphant's notion that
tribes had lost jurisdiction inconsistent with tribal dependent status. 29 Noting its
judicially created approach of "implicit divestiture," the Court determined that only the
rights "to protect tribal self-government or to control internal relations" are consistent
with tribal status.
30
The Court did not, however, create the same categorical rule prohibiting tribal
legislative jurisdiction over non-tribal citizens that it had announced in the criminal
context. Instead, it found a "general proposition" against such civil jurisdiction.3 But
the general proposition only extended to lands held in fee by nonmembers of the tribe,
and even it could be overridden by congressional action or by the inherent rights of
Indian tribes to protect their self-government. The Court produced its now-famous
"Montana exceptions:" two broad-based situations in which it indicated that Indian
tribes would retain civil jurisdiction over non-tribal citizens:
A tribe may regulate, through taxation, licensing, or other means, the
activities of nonmembers who enter consensual relationships with the
tribe or its members, through commercial dealing, contracts, leases, or
other arrangements.... A tribe may also retain inherent power to
exercise civil authority over the conduct of non-Indians on fee lands
within its reservation when that conduct threatens or has some direct
effect on the political integrity, the economic security, or the health or
welfare of the tribe.
32
It thus appeared that the Court in Montana, although unnecessarily extending
Oliphant to civil jurisdiction, had at least done so in a way that would preserve tribal
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jurisdiction over core tribal governmental functions. Over the years, however,
Montana has proved the more cruel of the decisions. Oliphant was an amputation;
Montana has been slow torture. The Montana exceptions held out hope, although
"bait" is perhaps more accurate of a term, that tribes would continue to exercise civil
jurisdiction over all persons throughout their territories where tribal interests were at
stake. Having established the exceptions, the Court has spent the last twenty-five years
picking away at them until virtually nothing is left.
In Montana, the Court held that the Crow Tribe had no authority to regulate
hunting and fishing by non-tribal citizens on fee lands within the reservation. The
activity of hunting and fishing on fee land neither involved consensual relationships
nor had direct effects on core tribal governmental interests. A few years later, the
Court revisited the second "direct effects" exception in Brendale v. Confederated
Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation.33 The plurality determined that tribes
could only zone fee land within their reservations if they could demonstrate that the
particular proposed use of the parcel of land would "imperil" those core interests. 34
Nearly a decade later, in Strate v. A-I Contractors, the Court rejected both exceptions,
finding that the tribal court did not have jurisdiction over a civil lawsuit between two
non-Indian parties to an automobile accident on a state highway running through the
reservation. It found no consensual relationship from the fact that one party to the
accident was an employee of a contractor working for the tribe, because the accident
did not arise out of the contractual relationship, and the other party to the accident was
a stranger to that relationship. The Court noted that careless driving would "surely
jeopardize the safety of tribal members," 36 but that was nonetheless insufficient to
constitute direct effects on core tribal governmental interests.
Most recently, the Court decided a pair of cases implicating the Montana
exceptions. In Nevada v. Hicks, the Court found no consensual relationship existed,
even though the state law enforcement officers obtained tribal court consent to the
service of a search warrant on trust property, because the intergovernmental
cooperation was not a "private" consensual arrangement.37 The same year, the Court
held in Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley38 that nonmember guests of a nonmember hotel
on fee land within the reservation had no consensual relationship with the tribe, even
though the tribe provided governmental services to the hotel and its guests. The Court
also stated that it did not see how the direct effects exception could be implicated.
This series of cases presents a remarkable litany of frustrated hopes. The Court
refuses to say what types of activities by nonmembers on fee lands would meet the
Montana exceptions. Instead, it allows tribes to make argument after argument, always
finding the tribes' positions insufficient. To add to the injury, the Court has recently
given up any pretense of analysis. Jeopardy, it finds, is not enough to show effects on
health and welfare. Hotel guests who use tribal services do not have a consensual
relationship because if they did, "the exception would swallow the rule." 39 The same
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situation does not create direct effects on any core tribal governmental interests simply
because the Court "fail[s] to see how" it might.4 °
At the same time that the Court has been picking away at the substance of the
Montana exceptions, it has been doing the same thing to the lands to which Montana
applies. Montana itself was very clear that tribal civil authority over nonmembers was
inconsistent with tribal status only on lands that had passed into fee status as a result of
the federal allotment policy of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. 41 The
Court determined that Congress could not have intended for non-Indians invited to
settle in Indian country to be subject to tribal jurisdiction.
In 1993, the Court abandoned its narrow view of the lands on which tribal
authority over nonmembers was inconsistent with tribal status. In South Dakota v.
Bourland, the Court applied the Montana exceptions to land owned in fee by the
federal government, taken for a flood control project.42 The reason the land was in fee
status was irrelevant; Montana governed whenever title to the land at issue was vested
in fee to nonmembers of the tribe. In Strate, the Court went further. The land at issue
in that case was a state highway running through the reservation. Although the right of
way was on trust land, the Court held that it was the jurisdictional equivalent of fee
land because the tribe had lost any "gate keeping right" to exclude the public from the
highway.
43
Most recently, and most disturbingly, the Court found Montana applicable on
trust lands. In Hicks,44 the question was whether a tribal member could sue state game
wardens in tribal court for alleged damage to his personal property when they served
him with a search warrant in connection with an off-reservation crime. The warrant
was served, and the alleged damage occurred, on trust land within the reservation. The
Court, in deciding that the tribal court did not have jurisdiction, noted that the status of
the land on which nonmember activity takes place "is only one factor to consider;" the
fact that the land was in trust status "is not alone enough" to guarantee tribal
jurisdiction. 45 Hicks can be readily confined to its facts: state officials serving process
in connection with an off-reservation crime. The majority opinion recognized this
limited nature of the holding;46 Justice Ginsburg's concurrence emphasized it;47 and
Justice O'Connor's concurrence argued that the majority had not given due weight to
the trust status of land at issue.48 Nonetheless, the majority opinion contains fairly
categorical language, and not one of the justices maintained that the trust status of the
land, in and of itself, barred state jurisdiction without congressional consent.
Moreover, Justice Souter argued that Montana should apply to all assertions of tribal
authority over nonmembers, even on "tribal or trust land., 49
The Court, in other words, has made substantial inroads on tribal civil
jurisdiction over non-tribal citizens. Those incursions can be laid squarely at
Oliphant's feet. In that 1978 decision, the Court set the framework: Indian tribes may
not exercise powers inconsistent with their status, and criminal jurisdiction over non-
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Indians is inconsistent. This judicial divestiture of tribal powers was then transferred
to civil jurisdiction. Initially, it appeared to be applied less destructively, by limiting
instead of eliminating tribal governmental authority. The steady march of the Court's
decisions since, however, has moved civil jurisdiction closer to criminal. Unless that
progress is reversed, Oliphant may soon be the rule in civil matters as well as in
criminal law.
IV. FINAL NOTE
The reasons to reargue and reconsider Oliphant should be apparent. Not only is
the Court's decision itself a morass of bad reasoning, but the case and its subsequent
impacts have hampered law enforcement, deprived tribes of the fundamental sovereign
right of territorial integrity, and virtually eliminated tribal civil authority over
nonmembers on fee lands or their equivalent. Oliphant is not, of course, the first
terrible decision the Court has ever made in Indian law. Occasionally, Congress will
override bad law,50 or the Court itself will even repudiate old decisions that offend
modem sensibilities. 5' We can only hope that one of these scenarios becomes
Oliphant's ultimate fate.
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